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Abstract
Disentangling the motivational drivers of individuals is frequently regarded a key
step in reconciling theory and empirical evidence on the voluntary provision of public
goods. We present results of a large online field experiments with 12,624 contribution
choices by members of the Internet-using German population. Subjects are assigned
to six treatments targeted at motivations such as altruism, “warm glow”, image
motivation, or equity concerns. While evidence on treatment effects is mixed, the
data point to significant effects of framing and the sequence of presenting options.
Exploiting variations within the highly heterogeneous sample, the results confirm
previous results from a subset of the data on sociodemographics and exogenous
environmental conditions as determinants of subjects’ choices and add additional
evidence that females and older subjects are more inclined to give to the public
good.
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1 Introduction
The question of the underlying drivers of the private provision of public goods has
spawned a still ongoing discussion in the literature. Since both empirically and ex-
perimentally, consumers voluntarily contribute to public goods at higher levels than
the standard theory predicts, several extensions of and alternatives to the traditional
theoretical formulation of the problem have been discussed. Most extensions concern
additional sources of utility over and above the “purely altruistic” setup, in which, be-
sides consumption, the overall level of the public good is the only argument in the utility
function, no matter how it is provided (Samuelson 1954, Bergstrom et al. 1986).
Among the additional drivers discussed, “warm glow”, image motivation, and moral
norms have received a considerable amount of attention. Commonly, the “warm glow”
of giving is defined as any private utility gains from the act of giving itself regardless of
its impact on the aggregate level of the public good (Cornes and Sandler 1984, Andreoni
1989, 1990). Also, it is assumed to increase in the size of one’s contribution. Image
motivation, in turn, is characterized by (1) the visibility of the contribution or pro-social
action and (2) by some (perceived) norm causing external (social) approval or sanctioning
(Akerlof 1980, Hollander 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Ariely et al. 2009). We may
therefore also call image motivation a social norm. In contrast, a norm where sanctioning
takes place internally, i.e. within the subject, may be called a moral norm (Brekke et al.
2003, Konow 2003). One may view the particular moral norm considered in the present
paper as a norm of distributive fairness or a concern for equity.
This paper reports results from five additional treatment groups in the experiment
reported in our articles “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the
Provision of Public Goods” and “Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and
Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence”.1 Treatments were designed to disen-
tangle, in a uniform, controlled procedure, the presence and strength of the four motiva-
tional drivers mentioned above in the propensity to contribute a 1 ton carbon emissions
reduction to the global pure public good of climate change mitigation. In total, the data
1Both papers are part of this dissertation. The latter is also available under Diederich and Goeschl
(2013).
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set contains 12,624 contribution choices made by 6,312 subjects.
Main results regarding a successful disentanglement of the targeted motivations
through the treatments are ambiguous. On the one hand, we find that when remov-
ing altruism from subjects’ set of motivations, contribution probabilities do not differ,
while when adding image motivation, there is weak evidence for an increase. Both find-
ings are plausible and in line with theory. On the other hand, several findings point to
difficulties of the experimental design to successfully operate: First, there is evidence for
strong framing effects as two theoretically equivalent treatments delivered significantly
different contribution probabilities from slight changes in the information given. Second,
results from an ex-post control questions suggest that the treatments removing altruism
from subjects’ set of motivations have not been well understood and thus may have
failed. Third, we find in a treatment combining the removal of altruism and the acti-
vation of image motivation that contribution probabilities increase relatively strongly
which is difficult to reconcile with the result of the two single treatments mentioned
above.
In addition to treatment effects, the set of available covariates provides an opportu-
nity to check previous results on determinants of contributions based on a subsample
of the full sample. Results confirm previous findings on sociodemographics such as a
highly significant correlation with education. Due to the larger statistical power, results
add evidence for a positive correlation of age and being female with the probability to
contribute to previously insignificant estimates. Lastly, additional evidence for a positive
causal effect of outdoor temperatures, matched to subjects’ choices by experimental day
and region of residence, on the probability to contribute can be provided.
2 Theoretical framework
The following presents a simple linear model to illustrate the treatment design. The
model is based on the standard impurely altruistic public good model (Andreoni 1989,
1990) and also draws from Benabou and Tirole (2006). Let utility be additively separable
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and expressed as
Ui =v
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where xi denotes i’s consumption of a monetary nume´raire, gi is i’s contribution to
the public good, and G = G−i + gi with G−i being contributions by others. The vector
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(
vxi , v
G
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denotes the individual’s valuations for money, the overall level of public
good, and own contributions, respectively. Thus, the second (third) term in (1) is the
altruistic (“warm glow”) component of utility. The last term represents image motivation
where η ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter of the visibility of the act of contributing to others, and
the vector γ i = (γ
G
i , γ
g
i ) denotes individual i’s concerns for being perceived by others
as altruistic and for being perceived as not interested into “warm glow” (the latter
corresponding to the “private reward” in Benabou and Tirole 2006). We assume that the
way expectations on vi are formed is common knowledge. Let the individual be endowed
with wealth wi and maximize utility with respect to a budget constraint wi = xi + pyi
where p denotes an M -dimensional vector of prices representing M available technologies
which convert the nume´raire into a unit of public good. Lastly, gi =
∑M
j=1 yij .
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2The model would owe realism a potential but, for our purposes here, unnecessary extension. One
property of the specific public good used in the experiment is that contributions will offset concur-
rent negative contributions since carbon emissions are a by-product of consumption in most economies
(Kotchen 2009). Drawing from Kotchen’s model, we could write net contributions as
gi =
M∑
j=1
yij − δxi, δ ∈ [0, 1]
where we assume a linear externality of private consumption on the public good, δxi. Thus, i’s direct
contributions now (partly) offset or exceed the harm done through consumption. Note that G−i may
now include some initial level of the public good provided by nature, and that the individual can boost G
also by reducing consumption. As an additional extension, one could assume δ to be individual-specific
and to represent the individual’s perception of the impact of consumption. We follow up on this issue
through questions in the post-experimental survey.
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The first-order derivative of (1) with respect to contribution technology j is
∂U
∂yij
=− pjvxi + vGi + vgi
+ η
γGi ∂E−i
(
vGi |
∑M
j=1 yij ,p
)
∂yij
− γgi
∂E−i
(
vgi |
∑M
j=1 yij ,p
)
∂yij
 . (2)
Obviously, the solution of the simple linear model will not be interior but fully depend on
the relative weight of the additive motivational components. In our experimental design,
we investigate whether a subject is willing to contribute one more unit to the public good.
That is, whether utility is increasing in yij at the current level of contributions.
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Note that the image term in (2) comprises of two effects: the change in others’
posterior expectation of i’s altruism and the change in their posterior expectation of i’s
interest in personal reward from giving. Both effects should be expected to be positive
from an increase of giving (Benabou and Tirole 2006). Hence the net effect of increasing
visibility η is unclear ex ante.
Differentiating between the four different components of utility is straightforward
formally. In order to isolate “warm glow” one needs to ensure anonymity, η = 0, and
exogenously keep G invariant to gi.
4 In this case, net marginal utility, vgi − pjvxi , is
either increasing or decreasing in yi which determines i’s experimental choice. This will
be the condition of our experimental “Warm glow” treatment. If we let G vary with gi,
this will correspond to the “Baseline” condition where both the “warm glow” and the
altruistic components are active. In the “Image” condition, η > 0. Comparison to the
Baseline will reveal whether the net effect of the image term is positive or negative.
Note that the production technology is constant across treatment conditions so far.
Different technologies can have different (perceived) by-products of producing the unit of
public good, however. It is clear that differences in attributes of the otherwise identical
good may affect utility of contributors (Hanley et al. 1998). We make use of this by
offering, in one treatment, another contribution technology which differs from production
3The possibility of field price censoring has been discussed at length in the article “To Give or Not
to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation).
4Note that vgi will, as a residual category, capture every source of utility that only depends on the
size of personal giving. This is “warm glow” by definition but may also relate to other motivations that
one would rather categorize into more complex moral reasoning (Brekke et al. 2003).
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via EUAs particularly with respect to equity effects due to the geographic region in which
the contribution would be produced (in a developing country instead of within the EU).
One attribute of the technology made explicit to subjects was that production in a
developing country would generate positive side benefits to the local population and
environment.5 In the model, we therefore assume for simplicity that the production
technologies of G differ only with respect to their impact on equity. Without explicit
functional specification, we may add a technology-dependent concern for equity, Q, to
utility. (1) becomes
Ui = Ui
(
vxi xi + v
G
i G+ v
g
i gi + ηR(γ i, gi,p);Q(y)
)
(3)
where R(·) denotes the image term in (1). Thus, Q plays only a role for treatment effects
when the technology changes.
3 Treatment Design
Inspired by the model above, the treatment design of the experiment (incompletely)
varies three factors: (1) whether the choice of the emissions reduction actually has an
impact on total emissions, (2) whether the choice is to some extent visible to others, and
(3) whether the choice has different distributional impacts (Table 1). This gave six treat-
ments in total. Treatments were administered to subjects in a two-stages counterfactual
design in order to allow for both between-subjects and within-subjects comparison of
behavior (Table 2).6 One reason for adding a within-subject component in design was
to exploit any coherence of treatment effects within subjects and to immunize treat-
ment effects against any arbitrariness in valuation or constructed preferences that could
manifest in between-subjects comparison (Ariely et al. 2003, Hanley et al. 2009).
At the beginning of the experiment7 subjects were informed that they would par-
5Following up on footnote 2, one explicit attribute of the baseline EUAs compared to the alternative
technology was that domestic production would contribute to emissions reductions in the region where
subjects’ personal negative contributions have occurred.
6Thus, the full sample of the Baseline treatment (excluding sceptics) analyzed in the two other papers
on this experiment consists of the pooled first-stage choices of experimental groups 1, 3, and 5.
7The reader is referred to the two articles “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and
the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation) and “Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action
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Table 1: Partial three-factor design of treatments
Factor 1:
Impact on total contributions
Factor 2 (Factor 3): Has impact Has no impact
Private contribution Base/EUA WG
(domestic)
Visible contribution Image WGI
(domestic)
Private contribution CER –
(developing country)
Notes: Base: Baseline treatment. WG: Warm Glow
treatment. WGI: Warm-Glow-Image treatment.
Table 2: Two-stages counterfactual design of the experiment
Stage Experimental group Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Base WG Base Image Base WGI EUA CER
2 WG Base Image Base WGI Base CER EUA
# of subjects: 779 778 784 796 792 798 788 797 6,312
Notes: Base: Baseline treatment. WG: Warm Glow treatment. WGI: Warm-Glow-Image
treatment.
ticipate in two consecutive lotteries. Following the first prize choice and, if applicable,
the FPC “filter” screen, subjects made a second choice based on another version on
the decision screen that administered a treatment condition by containing a different
description of how the public good would be provided, as described below. In two treat-
ments (EUA and CER), also a second information screen was shown that differed in
wording. If subjects opted for the cash prize in their second choice, a second FPC “fil-
ter” screen identical to that used in the first choice appeared. The following describes
the particular design and wording on the decision screen and, partially, the information
screen for each treatment condition.8
Baseline treatment. The Baseline treatment most closely corresponded to the situ-
ation known from laboratory public good experiments, but in a framed field experiment
(Harrison and List 2004) with a real public good and non-student subjects. In particular,
subjects’ choices were completely private information and affected total contributions.
and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence” (this dissertation and Diederich and Goeschl 2013)
for a full account of the experimental procedure.
8See the appendix for screenshots of these two experimental screen for each treatment (in German).
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Instructions on the decision screen described that winners would be notified via email
and that the deletion of the EUA, if they chose this prize, would be verifiable on a
Heidelberg University9 web page via a web link embedded in the notification email.
Warm Glow treatment. Differentiating “warm glow” from altruism and other mo-
tives is not a straightforward task. Most of the experimental designs in the laboratory
exogenously vary the individual opportunity cost of contributions and the marginal value
of the public good to separate between altruism and “warm glow” (Andreoni 1993, Pal-
frey and Prisbrey 1997, Goeree et al. 2002, Eckel et al. 2005). However, the marginal
benefit of a real public good is fixed. We therefore used a variant of a design by Crum-
pler and Grossman (2008) which mimics a complete crowding out of contributions.10 In
their experiment, subjects were informed that the charity they select would receive $10
from the experimenter. Subjects were then endowed with $10 and asked to indicate how
much of their endowment they would like to pass to the charity. Instructions stated that
“The amount contributed by the proctor to your selected charity WILL be reduced by
however much you pass to your selected charity. Your selected charity will receive neither
more nor less than $10.” Having made sure that subjects understood the procedure, the
authors find a stable average contribution rate of around 20% among 150 subjects. We
adapted this design by stating on the decision screen of the Warm Glow treatment:
“In this lottery, a certain number of emission allowances will definitely
be bought and deleted. The emission allowance offered to you today is part
of these allowances. This means that regardless of your choice, the number
of allowances to be deleted will not change. However, you have the oppor-
tunity to personally contribute to this emission reduction. You can do so by
foregoing the cash prize and selecting the emission reduction instead.”
One limitation of the design by Crumpler and Grossman (2008) is that it may allow
for an experimenter demand effect or a desire to give to the experimenter. The fact
9This mentioning of our home institution was the only hint to the identity of the experimenters in the
experiment and intended to increase credibility of the deletion confirmations to subjects. Confirmation
certificates of the deletion were official transaction protocols by the German Emissions Trading Authority
(DEHSt).
10Hence, this design corresponds to holding G constant in the model.
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that the experimenters’ identity was much less clear in our field setting mitigates this
problem: First, there was no personal interaction. Second, it was much less clear whose
financial burden would be reduced from contributing.
Image treatment. In order to boost visibility of a winners’ contribution compared
to the Baseline treatment, the decision screen described that the reduction-choosing
winner would be personally contacted by a staff member via email to arrange the EUA
deletion and to ask for the consent to publish the winners’ name on a section of YouGov’s
website dedicated to this purpose. This procedure increased visibility of the subject’s
pro-social choice while cash choices remained private. The more personal interaction
for deletion contrasts the anonymous aggregate deletion procedure announced in the
Baseline treatment. In order to account for potentially higher demands for data privacy
in an environment such as the Internet, subjects were informed that their names would
be published only with first name, the first letter of the surname, and city.
When designing the Image treatment, we deliberately decided not to increase visibil-
ity by issuing personalized certificates (hard copy or electronic) that confirm the deletion
(e.g Lo¨schel et al. 2010). The reason is that such certification can generate additional
private utility even if not shown to others. Thus, this option seemed unlikely to increase
visibility without activating additional sources of utility. Instead, subjects in the Image
treatment were informed, just like in the Baseline treatment, that the deletion would
be verifiable on a Heidelberg University website. In implementing this, winners of the
Image treatment were assigned a single EUA number in the notification email and could
verify that “their” EUA number fell within a range of EUA numbers for which a single
official deletion confirmation was provided on a Heidelberg University webpage.
Another feature in treatment design of the Image treatment comes out of the theo-
retical model. Since the size of the net image effect in eq. (2) is likely to depend on p, we
“wash out” these second order effects by concealing the price a winning contributor has
faced. Therefore, instructions noted that the alternative cash prize of a winner would
not be made public and that other participants may face different trade-offs.
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Warm Glow Image treatment (WGI). This treatment exactly combined the in-
structions of the Warm Glow and the Image treatments. Thus, we added publicity to the
barebone “warm glow” motivation to contribute in the Warm Glow treatment. The text
of the decision screen made clear which informations would be published, thus subjects
could conclude that the information on whether their EUA was pre-bought or not would
not be disclosed.
EUA and CER treatments. These treatments were designed to facilitate a change
in abatement technologies. Thus, the CER treatment offered a Certified Emissions Re-
duction (CER) based on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol instead of an EUA. The CER was of the “Gold Standard” quality.11 Instructions
explicitly mentioned the differences between both technologies along two dimensions:
(1) region of abatement and (2) region of investment. We expected both to give rise to
specific equity concerns or moral considerations. While the former can trigger a polluter-
pays motivation in favor of domestic abatement through an EUA, the latter can trigger
distributional concerns due to the side-benefits of Gold Standard CERs which require
the carbon offset project to benefit the local community and local environment in a
developing country.12 Both motivations can be found in anecdotal evidence.13 For the
experimental implementation, presentation of the two technologies required not only
two different decision screens but also two different information screens. For the EUA
treatment, both screens closely corresponded to the Baseline treatment, with minor
differences (see the results below).
4 Results
Before turning to treatment effects, we compare (independent) behavior in the first
lottery of subjects in the pooled Baseline groups 1, 3, and 5 with that of subjects in
the EUA group 7. Since both treatments correspond to the same combination of factors
11http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org
12Thus, the difference between both technologies may be interpreted as a normative conflict between
equality and equity (Konow 2003, Nikiforakis et al. 2012).
13For example, Carbon Retirement, a commercial UK based service for deleting EUAs, advertises with
the feature of domestic abatement for moral reasons.
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(Table 1), behavior should not differ. The result is, however, that contribution choices
of the EUA treatment significantly exceed those in the Baseline treatment (p = 0.01 for
a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test and student’s t test), by about 3.8%. Thus, minor
changes in framing of the screens had a remarkably significant impact: The information
and decision screens of both theoretically identical treatments differed only slightly
at three places in the text. First, in presenting the two options in headlines on the
information screen, the option of “reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton” added
“within the European Union” in the EUA treatment. Second, within the text below, it
stated that this would reduce “domestic emissions in Germany and other EU countries, to
which your personal energy use contributes” instead of only saying that this would reduce
“emissions in Germany and other EU countries” as in the Baseline treatment. Third, the
decision screen in the baseline noted that the deletion of EU allowances would take place
through a “joint order” for all winners choosing this option. The first two differences
were intended to help contrasting the EUA treatment from the CER treatment, the third
difference was intended to help contrasting the Warm Glow and Image treatments from
the Baseline, which was not necessary in the EUA treatment. Since all three differences
occurred simultaneously, we cannot further differentiate between the possible causes of
this framing effect. The following will therefore present results for the EUA and CER
treatments separately from those of the other treatments.
In the analysis, choices in the first lottery, which are completely independent from
each other, can be directly compared between-subjects. To exploit both choices each
subject made, analysis through panel regressions will account for between- and within
subject effects. Table 3 reports results of Probit regressions of the choice of the emissions
reduction comparing the Baseline treatment with the treatments Warm Glow, Image,
and WGI. Columns (1) to (3) are Probit regressions reporting between-subjects differ-
ences of choices in the first lottery. Columns (4) to (6) account for the panel structure of
the two-lottery counterfactual design and report results of random-effects Probit regres-
sions. Columns (4) to (6) thus also take into account within-subject treatment effects as
well as a “time” trend. Some specifications control for subjects’ characteristics and for
matched exogenous environmental conditions used in previous analyses. Table 4 restates
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descriptions of these variables and provides summary statistics for the full experimental
sample.
Coefficient estimates of treatment effects are positive throughout. However, estimates
are mostly insignificant with the exception of the WGI treatment (marginal effect up to
3.5%) and, for one specification only, the Image treatment (marginal effect 2.8%).
The insignificant difference between Baseline and Warm Glow treatments would im-
ply that altruism was a negligible motivational component in subjects’ choices. However,
evidence for a lack of understanding of the treatment design of the two “warm glow”
treatments comes from a control question in which we asked subjects in treatment groups
1, 2, 5, and 6 for the number of lotteries (“both”, “one”, or “none of the lotteries”) in
which a winner’s prize choice would influence the actual amount of emissions reductions.
Overall, only 13.8% chose the correct answer (“one lottery”).
A positive effect of visibility of the contribution, implied marginally by the results, is
in line with the theoretical expectations and indicates that subjects expectation of being
perceived as altruistic when observed in the act of contributing by others (the first term
in eq. (2)) seems to dominate.
In light of the results of the Warm Glow and Image treatments, the comparably large
positive effect of the WGI treatment appears counterintuitive, however. This is even
more so as the “warm glow” component of the treatment has apparently not been well
understood as the control question mentioned above indicates. Again, framing effects
could be the reason for this otherwise inconclusive effect: In exactly combining the
wording of the two other treatments, the WGI treatment contained the largest amount
of text of all treatments. Potentially, an apparently more detailed description, compared
to the Baseline, may have increased subjects’ trust in the procedure, or made the option
more interesting from an hedonic point of view.
In contrast to the weak evidence on treatments, the results show a highly significant
effect of repetition. Estimated at the margin, subjects are up to 57.8% more likely to
choose the emissions reduction in the second lottery.
Estimates of other covariate effects confirm previous analyses of the Baseline subsam-
ple but also add additional evidence based on the increased statistical power of the full
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Table 3: Probit coefficient estimates comparing Baseline, Warm Glow, Image, and WGI
treatments. Dependent variable: choice of emission reduction.
Between-subjects Between- and within-subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment:
Warm Glow 0.065 0.055 0.057 0.027 0.106 0.125
(0.061) (0.069) (0.070) (0.088) (0.103) (0.106)
Image 0.069 0.112* 0.101 0.074 0.051 0.081
(0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.087) (0.102) (0.105)
WGI 0.132** 0.124* 0.118* 0.157* 0.118 0.146
(0.059) (0.067) (0.068) (0.085) (0.100) (0.103)
Lottery 2 – – – 0.578*** 0.445*** 0.451***
(0.055) (0.065) (0.067)
Cash prize – -0.004*** -0.004*** – -0.020*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Female – 0.084* 0.081 – 0.311** 0.298**
(0.050) (0.051) (0.127) (0.130)
Age – 0.003* 0.003* – 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Education – 0.051*** 0.052*** – 0.139*** 0.143***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Income – -0.011 -0.013 – -0.034 -0.038
(0.015) (0.015) (0.038) (0.039)
Ambient temperature – – 0.009 – – 0.034**
(0.006) (0.017)
Media coverage – – -0.001 – – 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant -0.985*** -1.595*** -1.661*** -4.190*** -5.179*** -5.974***
(0.031) (0.138) (0.236) (0.117) (0.367) (0.625)
N 4727 3866 3763 9454 7732 7526
Log-likelihood -2179.660 -1737.092 -1691.138 -3866.061 -3053.855 -2963.011
χ2 5.389 75.290 81.157 114.634 290.534 283.337
D.f. 3 8 10 4 9 11
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.021 0.023
AIC 4367.319 3492.184 3404.276 7744.122 6129.711 5952.022
BIC 4393.164 3548.524 3472.838 7787.047 6206.195 6042.062
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are Probit coefficient estimates of the choice of emission reduction in the
first lottery. Columns (4)-(6) are random-effects Probit estimates of choices in the full panel,
reported as marginal effects at the sample means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
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Table 4: Summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics (N = 6, 312)
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 1 if female 0.475 0.499 0 1
Age Subject’s age (years) 45.73 14.57 18 91
Years of education Years based on subject’s stated highest
educational degree
12.26 3.222 9 22
Income Midpointa of subject’s reported monthly
household net income category (Euros)
2,508 1,681 450 8,000
Environmental controls
Ambient temperature Mean ambient outdoor temperature in
subject’s region of residenceb (◦C)
15.08 4.089 8.05 25.8
Media attention Number of hits for a climate change re-
lated keyword searchc in German print
and online mediab
135.7 29.34 69.5 160
Notes: a In our income approximation, for the ‘less than e 500’ category, we assume e 450. For
the two categories above e 5,000, we assume e 8,000 for compatibility with German census data.
The remaining categories have widths of e 500. b The variable is the moving 2-day average of the
daily values of the day at which the subject took the experiment and the day before c Keywords
used: ‘climate change’, ‘climate protection’, ‘global warming ’, ‘carbon dioxide’, ‘CO2’. Database:
LexisNexis d Answer categories 1=disagree, 2=tend to disagree, 3=tend to agree, 4=agree e
Median is 10 f Median is 50
sample. Results for the effects of price, education, and income corroborate the estimates
in our article “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of
Public Goods” (this dissertation) in sign, size, and significance. In addition, the higher
statistical power of the full sample reveals some evidence for positive correlations of be-
ing female and older with the choice of the contribution (marginal effect up to 31% for
being female and up to 0.1% per year for age). This finding is in accordance with some
previous works, while others have found insignificant effects.14
In exploiting the statistical power of the full sample, there is also evidence in support
of the effects of matched environmental controls analyzed in our article “Willingness to
Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence”
(this dissertation and Diederich and Goeschl 2013): Higher ambient outdoor temper-
atures in a subject’s region of residence around the time the subject took part in the
experiment caused a higher probability of choosing the emissions reduction. The effect
is significant in the panel regression only, however (marginal effect 3%).
Finally, Table 5 reports the same model specifications in comparing EUA and CER
treatments. Estimates of the treatment effect are ambiguous with some weak within-
14See the original article for references.
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Table 5: Probit coefficient estimates comparing EUA and CER treatment. Baseline:
EUA treatment. Dependent variable: choice of emission reduction.
Between-subjects Between- and within-subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CER treatment -0.022 -0.057 -0.050 0.124* 0.070 0.085
(0.072) (0.082) (0.083) (0.075) (0.085) (0.087)
Lottery 2 – – – 0.615*** 0.563*** 0.550***
(0.080) (0.091) (0.092)
Cash prize – -0.001 -0.001 – -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Female – 0.020 0.010 – 0.056 0.056
(0.087) (0.088) (0.166) (0.169)
Age – 0.008** 0.007** – 0.011* 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Education – 0.045*** 0.045*** – 0.092*** 0.090***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026)
Income – 0.031 0.032 – 0.077 0.074
(0.025) (0.026) (0.050) (0.051)
Ambient temperature – – 0.002 – – -0.018
(0.011) (0.022)
Media coverage – – -0.000 – – -0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.840*** -1.777*** -1.730*** -2.675*** -3.864*** -3.092***
(0.051) (0.245) (0.416) (0.190) (0.518) (0.821)
N 1585.000 1256.000 1230.000 3170.000 2512.000 2460.000
Log-likelihood -787.516 -605.400 -596.333 -1492.148 -1171.425 -1146.591
χ2 0.091 25.989 24.333 62.349 90.271 84.913
D.f. 1.000 6.000 8.000 2.000 7.000 9.000
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.021 0.020
AIC 1579.031 1224.800 1210.666 2992.296 2360.851 2315.182
BIC 1589.768 1260.749 1256.699 3016.542 2413.310 2379.069
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are Probit coefficient estimates of the choice of emission reduction in the
first lottery. Columns (4)-(6) are random-effects Probit estimates of choices in the full panel,
reported as marginal effects at the sample means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
subject evidence for a preferring the CER through an offset project in a developing
country (marginal effect 12%). Other estimates are qualitatively similar but statistically
weaker than in Table 3 due to smaller size of the subsample.
5 Conclusion
Following up on previous analyses, this paper presented additional results of treatments
targeted at contribution motives known from the literature such as “warm glow”, im-
age motivation, and equity concerns based on a framed field experiment on giving to
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a real and global public good: climate change mitigation. Results regarding the disen-
tanglement of these motives are ambiguous: On the one hand we find an insignificant
presence of altruism compared to a “warm glow” of giving and a slightly positive image
motivation, which is in line with theoretical predictions.15 On the other hand, these
results do not align with our finding of a relatively strong positive effect when simply
combining these two treatments, i.e., removing altruism and adding image motivation in
a combined treatment. Also, the two altruism-removing “warm glow” treatments were
apparently not well understood by subjects. Besides, there is evidence for framing ef-
fects such that slight changes in wording had significant impacts. Other than treatment
effects, a strong result is that subjects are much more inclined to choose the emissions
reduction if presented with a second chance. Regarding covariate effects, results of the
previous analyses are confirmed. In addition, the higher statistical power of the present
sample allows us to find evidence for a positive effect of age and being female on the
likelihood of contribution the emissions reduction.
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Appendix
Information and decision screens
This section contains screenshots of the actual screens used in the experiment (in German). Translations
of the screens belonging to the Baseline treatment can be found in the appendix to the article “To Give
or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation).
Translations of the other treatments can be mostly found in the text above.
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Figure 1: Information screen of the Baseline, Warm Glow, Image, and WGI treatments
Figure 2: Decision screen, Baseline treatment
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Figure 3: Decision screen, Warm Glow treatment
Figure 4: Decision screen, Image treatment
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Figure 5: Decision screen, WGI treatment
Figure 6: Information screen of the EUA treatment
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Figure 7: Decision screen, EUA treatment
Figure 8: Information screen of the CER treatment
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Figure 9: Decision screen, CER treatment
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